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Abstract 
Nikos Scandamis’ essay L’Etat dans l’Union européenne: Passion d’un 
grand acteur suggests the EU has flayed the Westphalian Leviathan. It has 
laid its dark insides bare to relentless scrutiny. But perhaps it could only 
do so by appropriating these dark insides for itself. The ombre spirituel 
that Schmitt associated with sovereign statehood does not seem to have 
disappeared like the rest of nationalistic mists before the rising sun of 
European integration. It has simply shifted along with the pretensions of 
this rising sun. The market place has in broad daylight become the source 
of a new shadow. This response to Scandamis argues that the CJEU, the 
principal agent of EU integration since its decisions in Costa v ENEL 
and Van Gend & Loos, has simply taken over the many ombres spiri-
tuels of the Member States in the form of one cloudy jurisprudence that 
allows for little democratic transparency. True, the EU does not claim to 
be a sovereign state as yet and it is often said that its goal is also not to be-
come one. In the meantime, however, it pursues its governmental goals in 
the manner of a sovereign state under the ombre spirituel offered by the 
obscure jurisprudence of its highest judiciary. 
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I. Introduction 
THE demise of the Westphalian state in the European Union 
is surely the key theme of Nikos Scandamis’ essay L’Etat 
dans l’Union européenne: Passion d'un grand acteur. One of 
the significant results of this demise, argues Scandamis, is the 
loss of the opacity or invisibility that characterised the West-
phalian state. At issue in Scandamis’ essay is, in other words, 
the demise of the state as a person – a persona – that can hide 
as much as and perhaps more than it shows. The compliance 
of the European Member State with the Kelsenian and Webe-
rian demands of complete normativity and transparency has 
thus come to deprive the state of the last vestiges of state se-
crecy which it may have enjoyed under Westphalian concep-
tions of statehood. 
The concern with secrets of state or the secrecy of the state – 
the so-called Arcana – is bound to lead one in the direction of 
the political thinking of Carl Schmitt. Few modern political or 
legal theorists stressed the existence and need for the Arcana 
of the state more than Schmitt did1. It is therefore no surprise 
                                                   
1 See CARL SCHMITT’s evidently sceptical discussion of the liberal 
dismissal of the Arcana in his Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heuti-
gen Parlamentarismus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996 [1923]) 48. 
For an illuminating discussion, see OLIVER KOHNS, Arkan Politik in 
der Moderne – Der Imperativ der Öffentlichkeit, das Staatsgeheim-
nis und die politische Paranoia Forum für Politik, Gesellschaft und 
Kultur, Juni 2013, 4-7. Sovereignty, observes Kohns poignantly, is 
the essential rest of the pre-modern conceptions of the need for 
states to sustain a certain secrecy: “Auch der modern Staat beans-
prucht, mit anderen Worten, eine – wenn auch limitierte – Aussetzung 
der juristischen Ordnung, um die staatliche Ordnung als Ganzes gegen 
innere oder äußere Gegner zu schützen und zu verteidigen. In der Staats-
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that Scandamis would take Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty as 
the polar opposite of the Kelsenian/Weberian concern with 
the state as a fully transparent and strictly normative entity. 
Scandamis highlights crucial aspects of the Schmittian con-
cept of state sovereignty in this regard. By reserving the com-
petence or capacity to claim a potentia absoluta that exceeds its 
law, the state also exists outside the legal sphere that it sus-
tains. Its potentia absoluta renders it legibus solutus and creates 
a sphere outside itself – une espace dehors. This espace dehors, 
which frames the domain of the rule of law inside the state, 
renders possible an ombre spirituel de l’Etat, that is, a spiritual 
umbrella in the shade of which all state action can be total-
ised with reference to the term public interest2. 
At issue in this Schmittian conception, in other words, is a 
state that precedes its own law and the rule of its law. This 
state that precedes its law would give way in Kelsen’s theory 
of law, to the law that precedes the state, that is, the law that 
establishes and defines the state with reference to a basic 
norm or Grundnorm. But, the shift from the Schmittian to the 
Kelsenian state was not just a theoretical development, 
claims Scandamis. The theoretical development reflected a 
social development that occurred within the empirical reality 
of the modern state. According to him, antagonism within 
the state led to the expulsion of the arcane Schmittian state 
and gave rise to the liberal distinction between state and civil 
society and the liberal requirement that the state be tied to 
                                                   
theorie wird diese Aussetzung als das Prinzip der Souveränität bezeich-
net.”  
2 NIKOS SCANDAMIS, L’Etat dans l’Union européenne: Passion d'un 
grand acteur, Revue du Droit Public et de la Science Politique en France 
et à l’Etranger, 01 Septembre, no. 5, 1335. 
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transparent norms that civil society can take as guarantees 
for its liberty. Scandamis invokes here a development that an 
early work of Luhmann would analyse in a most probing 
way; we will return to this Luhmannian analysis below. 
 In the process of European integration, argues Scandamis, 
the Kelsenian/Weberian state finally comes into its own as a 
structure of full compliance with norms that are exhaustively 
scrutinised from without and within. Not only does the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (hereafter CJEU) constitute 
an external control of the state’s compliance with EU norms, 
but also the state’s own judiciary constitutes an internal con-
trol that extends EU normative surveillance into the deepest 
recesses of its existence. This internalisation of the scrutiny of 
its norms completes the destruction of the person of the state. 
It dismantles the last resorts of personhood, that is, the last 
remains of any kind of mask or persona that allows for the 
acts of an actor. From this erasure of personhood also ensues 
the ultimate Weberian reduction of the state, namely, the re-
duction of the state to a system of administrative acts that are no 
longer acts in the real sense of the word. The “acts” at issue 
here no longer relate to personal deliberation and decision-
making. They are mechanical executions of pre-existing 
norms that are, in turn, exhaustively reflected in the execu-
tion. This, then, is the marriage between Kelsen and Weber 
that Scandamis invokes with regard to the remains of state-
hood in the EU. 
What is lost in this process? At issue is a loss to which a 
Greek political theorist may be especially sensitive. Speaking 
for a moment with Heidegger, one can say it is the quintes-
sentially Greek concern with aletheia – with the shadow, 
shade, veiling or sheltering that allows for a portraying sil-
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houette in the midst of the most glaring illuminations – that 
faces annulation in this depersonification of the state3. A brief 
Nietzschean recollection of loss is also apposite here: It is in 
bright daylight that the madman would enter the market 
place with a lantern to disclose, finally, the vast nothingness 
that would come to mark the age of nihilism. The dawn – 
Enlightenment – no longer brings light, only more night, sug-
gested Nietzsche’s madman4. 
The Westphalian state was effectively dismantled in two 
shifts; the shift from the Schmittian conception of the state as 
ombre spirituel to the Kelsenian conception of the fully norma-
tive state; and the shift that would reduce the latter internally 
to a Weberian residue, namely, a rationalised system of ad-
ministrative action devoid of human actors. This double 
movement, argues Scandamis, would ultimately leave to the 
state only the thin margin of state action that it might still en-
joy in the context of international law. In the response to 
Scandamis’ essay that follows here, I will reconsider this cen-
tral thesis of the essay in two steps. The first step is ex-
pounded in Section II. It consists in questioning whether 
Kelsen’s conception of the state really plays the role devised 
                                                   
3 Whether this is a truly “Greek” concern or just an invention of 
Heidegger that he attributed to the Greeks is a question that cannot 
be addressed here. It is nevertheless worth noting briefly that there 
is significant support for this attribution among philologists. See for 
instance PAUL FRIENDLÄNDER, Plato I: An Introduction (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1958), 221-229.  
4 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Die frohliche Wissenschaft in: Sämtliche 
Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol 3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1999) 481: “Kommt nicht immerfort die Nacht und mehr Nacht? Müssen 
nicht Laternen am Vormittage angezündet werden?”. 
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for it in Scandamis’ scheme and whether it is not Kelsen’s 
rather than Schmitt’s theory of law and the state that pro-
vides the state with the ombre spirituel that Scandamis in-
vokes. Normative claims themselves become the spiritual 
shade in which the state can shelter its citizens in Kelsen’s 
theory of the state and of law. This kind of normative shelter-
ing of political concerns can of course not qualify as honest 
politics in the books of anyone who insists on the existential 
or concrete nature of the political. Schmitt was therefore only 
consistent when he called this normative politics “cheating”. 
Section II ultimately dismisses Schmitt’s views in this regard. 
It nevertheless examines them closely, for they do allow a 
probing perspective on a key element of contemporary EU 
politics to which Section III turns. 
Section III comprises the second step of this response to 
Scandamis’ argument regarding the demise of the ombre spiri-
tuel of statehood in the EU. It consists in showing how a cer-
tain fundamental rights normativity and indeed a Kantian-
Kelsenian normativity can indeed be considered an honest or 
non-cheating ombre spirituel under which states can continue 
to shelter the humanity of their citizens, provided a certain 
civil societal reduction of this normativity does not come to 
destroy this sheltering potential while claiming to guarantee 
it. This is indeed what is going on in the EU today, claims 
Section III, because of the institutional framework under 
which the new ombre spirituel of the EU presents itself. It is 
this institutional framework, and not its substantive norma-
tivity, that turns the new ombre spirituel of the EU into an 
instance of institutional and political cheating. In other 
words, in response to Scandamis’ claim regarding the expul-
sion of the ombre spirituel of statehood in the EU, I will argue 
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in what follows that this ombre spirituel has actually not been 
expelled by the EU. The EU has simply appropriated it for it-
self, and has done so, moreover, in a disingenuous way. 
What follows is ultimately an argument for a restoration of 
parliamentary democracy in the EU by either inaugurating it 
properly at EU level or restoring it properly at Member State 
level. The parliamentary democracy argued for will be pre-
sented – with reference to Niklas Luhmann, Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde and Claude Lefort – as an honest engagement 
with the abyssal void from which all political existence and 
all concentrations or exercises of power derive. The void 
from which politics and power derive constantly exposes 
them to the mysterious origin or secret of political existence. 
Democracy is the only political form that consciously takes 
issue with this secret from which it derives. It does so by ac-
cepting that this secret cannot be revealed. No obscurantism 
will be afoot here, however. The democratic ombre spirituel 
that my response to Scandamis advocates, proposes no re-
treat from the Enlightenment insistence on public account-
ability and transparency in politics and government, and no 
compromise of the Kantian principle of moral autonomy and 
the human rights culture associated with it. To the contrary, 
the Enlightenment demands for transparency in politics, 
moral autonomy and fundamental rights will be raised to a 
stricter level of scrutiny through which it will become clear 
that these demands themselves also constitute an ombre spiri-
tuel, that is, a spiritual shadow that allows for and shelters 
sovereign concentrations or exercises of power, without pro-
viding them with any revealed or clarified foundations. What 
distinguishes the Enlightenment or Kantian concern with 
transparent democratic politics from other exercises of power 
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does therefore not consist in the one being an instance of 
transparent normative consensus while the others remain 
opaque deployments of force. It consists in the former re-
maining a consistent and candid avowal of the irreducible 
groundlessness that precipitates political existence, while the 
latter invariably turn into disavowals of this groundlessness 
that claim to have fathomed their own depths5. 
II. The Pure Theory of Law:  
A Source of Sovereign Sheltering 
Schmitt would regularly express a sense of dismay and 
exasperation with regard to Kelsen’s legal theoretical insis-
tence that everything begins with a norm. Kelsen’s system of 
                                                   
5  The concern with that which withdraws from whatever be-
comes manifest, the concern with “truth” as that which is never re-
vealed in what appears, to which the Greeks referred as aletheia (see 
again note 3 above), evidently runs through the whole argument 
that follows. It should be stressed, however, that the argument dis-
sociates itself from the bizarre obscurantism with which Heidegger 
would distort and betray this thought after brilliantly bringing it to 
the attention of twentieth-century philosophy. Of concern is, in-
stead, the raising of this thought to the level of a second-order scru-
tiny of Enlightenment values and principles as rhetorical organisa-
tions of groundless formations of power and not the antithesis of 
power as they are often presented. The obnoxious and idiotic ex-
tremes to which Heidegger’s obscurantism would lead have again 
come to the fore recently with the publication of his Schwarze Hefte 
1931-1938, 1938-1939 and 1939-1941, Gesamtausgabe 94, 95, 96 
(Frankfurt a.M: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014). For an incisive discus-
sion of this publication, see Heidegger: la boîte noire des Cahiers, Cri-
tique, décembre 2014.  
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law, contended Schmitt, turns on a bottomless positivism in 
terms of which a norm applies simply because and when it 
applies – “[e]twas gilt wenn es gilt und weil es gilt[, d]as ist 
Positivismus”6. 
Kelsen was surely well aware that the political and the legal 
does not begin with a norm, and therefore also not with a 
Grundnorm. Kelsen knew, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde ob-
served, that questions regarding the origin and end of legal 
systems ultimately take one out of the realm of the “ought” 
and into the realm of the “is”; out of the sphere of normativ-
ity and into the sphere of facticity or existence. He referred in 
this regard to this passage from Kelsen’s Hauptprobleme der 
Staatsrechtslehre: 
 
“It is extraordinarily significant that the question regarding the 
beginning and end of norms can only be answered by moving 
from the world of normativity [Soll] to the world of existence 
[Sein]. The inverse also applies. The question regarding the be-
ginning and end of existence invariably takes one out of the 
world of existence and into the world of normativity. That 
makes clear that the question regarding the beginning and end 
of normativity exceeds normative observation and the methods 
of normative knowledge”7. 
                                                   
6 Ibid. 
7 HANS KELSEN, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre: Entwickelt aus 
der Lehre vom Rechtssatze (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1984), 9-10: “Es ist 
außerordentlich bezeichnend, daß man die Frage nach dem Anfange und 
dem Ende, der Enstehung und Zerstörung des Soll nur insofern beant-
worten kann, als man aus der Welt des Soll in die des Seins übergeht; und 
daß man bei derselben Frage in bezug auf das Sein in die Welt des Soll 
gerät. Daran zeigt sich deutlich, daß die Frage nach Enstehung und Zer-
störung des Soll nicht mehr in der nur auf das Soll gerichteten Beobach-
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Kelsen’s pure theory of law and concomitant normative re-
duction or definition of the state cannot, in view of this pas-
sage, be explained in terms of an inexplicable blindness 
regarding the existential origins of all normativity. That this 
cannot be done is also evident from his self-consciously con-
structionist conception of the Grundnorm as something that 
does not exist, something that for reason of this non-existence 
can only be presupposed (vorausgesetzt werden) and never be 
posited (gesetzt werden)8. This constructionist move is the es-
sential step in the pure theory of law through which Kelsen 
opts to illuminate or highlight only the norm and not its non-
normative or existential origins. And, it is with this illumina-
tion of normativity that Kelsen’s pure theory of law allows the 
existential origins of law and the state to remain a realm of 
shadows that cannot be brought into the light of the state and 
state laws. And the question is whether this is not, in the final 
analysis, a more effective sheltering of the political than 
Schmitt’s relentless insistence to always expose the existential 
foundation of the political as the real and ultimate condition 
                                                   
tungsebene und innerhalb der normativen Erkenntnismethode liegt.” On 
Kelsen’s consistent methodological anti-sociological refusal to en-
gage with questions of existence and to restrict jurisprudence to a 
pure concern with the legal sphere of normativity or “ought”, cf. 
HANS KELSEN, Über Grenzen zwischen juristischer und soziologischer 
Methode: Vortrag, gehalten in der Soziologischen Gesellschaft zu Wien 
(Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1970). 
8  See HANS KELSEN, Reine Rechtslehre (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 
1994) 66-67. For a more extensive discussion of this element of 
Kelsen’s thinking, see JOHAN VAN DER WALT The Horizontal Effect 
Revolution and the Question of Sovereignty (Berlin/Boston: Walter de 
Gruyter, 2014) 315-323. 
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for and of normativity (for: no normativity without existential 
political foundations; of: normativity is essentially a reflection 
or function of political existence and has no significantly 
separate existence and can be undone at any moment). 
Given his conviction that positive normativity only endures 
at the behest of the political, it is completely consistent of 
Schmitt to consider invocations of morality or normativity in 
politics dishonest. The one who takes recourse to the concept 
of human rights or to humanity in political conflicts, argues 
Schmitt with reference to Proudhon, wants to cheat – “Wer 
Menschheit sagt will betrügen”9. This view is surely consistent 
with a point of departure that considers the political an exis-
tential moment in the life of the people for which normativity 
may at most be an initial catalyst, but ultimately belongs to a 
different order of (the assessments of) things that is no longer 
relevant once the realm of the political moves firmly to the 
fore10. It is evidently an unabashed existential realism that is 
afoot here. When existential concerns of dominance and sur-
vival are at stake, morality or normativity becomes a secon-
dary consideration for those who hold this existentialist view. 
The point of invoking this realism here is neither to endorse, 
nor to question or dismiss it. The debate whether the founda-
tions of the political are existential or normative can be traced 
all the way to Thucydides11 and one is surely not going to 
contribute anything significant to it within the span of the 
few pages of argument that can be offered here. 
                                                   
9  CARL SCHMITT, Der Begriff des Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 1996) 55. 
10 Ibid.  
11  THUCYDIDES, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book V, CV, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938, 166-167.  
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So why invoke here Schmitt’s realist assessment of human 
rights claims in political conflict as a form of cheating? We 
invoke it here, in the first place, to show why this assessment 
is wrong and why the invocation of fundamental rights can 
constitute an honest political concern. Invocation of human 
rights claims in political conflict is undoubtedly an essential 
rhetorical strategy of contemporary sovereigns. And one can 
add to this that such invocation is essentially a rhetorical prac-
tice. But, recognising something as a rhetorical practice does 
not as such – that is, for reasons of being recognised as rheto-
ric – amount to a recognition of cheating, unless subscription 
to the Platonic separation of truth from rhetoric forces one to 
take this rather metaphysical stance12. Schmitt’s imputation 
                                                   
12 The great Humanist tradition of rhetoric and rhetorical studies 
that would begin after Plato with Aristotle, ascend to prominence 
in classical Roman culture and sixteenth-century Renaissance Hu-
manism, and receive a significant revival with the hermeneutic turn 
in twentieth-century humanities and social science, would hold to 
the contrary that rhetoric is the source and not the distortion of 
truth. For instructive discussions of this tradition, see ERNESTO 
GRASSI, Rhetoric as Philosophy. The Humanist Tradition (University 
Park and London: Pennsylvania University Press, 1980) and 
MICHAEL MOONEY, Vico in the Tradition of Rhetoric (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985). One of the strongest arguments 
for rhetoric as the source of normativity would emerge from the 
work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. See his discussion of the humanist 
tradition in GADAMER, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: JCB Mohr 
(Paul Siebeck), 1975, 1-39 as well as GADAMER, Rhetorik und Herme-
neutik (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002). The essence of 
Gadamer’s response to Habermas in the “critical theory - herme-
neutics debate” also concerned the point that the normative cri-
tiques of traditions for which Habermas argued are themselves rhe-
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of cheating to all human rights claims in political conflicts 
would seem to hark back to a bygone age of metaphysical 
separations between truth and rhetoric. Schmitt’s metaphys-
ics may well be more inversely Platonic than Platonic, consid-
ering its insistence on the truth of the political will that in-
forms all invocations of normativity, but as Heidegger has 
pointed out masterfully with regard to the inversion of 
Plato’s ideas embodied in the Nietzschean invocation of the 
will to power, the difference between Platonism and inverse 
Platonism is less significant than it seems13 . From a truly 
post-Platonic (and post-Nietzschean) point of departure, 
however, more than just rhetoric is required to constitute a 
case of cheating. Rhetoric can also be employed for purposes 
of cheating, no doubt, but it is not always employed thus. We 
shall come back to this point below. 
                                                   
torical traditions. See GADAMER, Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideolo-
giekritik and Replik in: Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt 
a.M: Suhrkamp, 1971) 57-82 and 283-317, especially at 307. Among 
contemporary constitutional scholars this understanding of the re-
lation between normative argument and rhetoric is most expres-
sively recognised by Martin Loughlin, considering his forceful ar-
guments regarding historical practices of statecraft as the only vi-
able response to irresolvable normative questions – “questions that 
have no objective answers,” as he puts it well. It is from this per-
spective that Loughlin insists, in a manner consistent with the tradi-
tion of rhetoric and hermeneutics, that “[the precepts of] the ‘rule of 
law’ have no transcendental validity.” They too belong to a “wider 
body of political practices”. See LOUGHLIN, The Idea of Public Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 156-157. 
13  Cf. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, Nietzsche I, II (Pfullingen: Günther 
Neske, 1961). 
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A consistently post-Platonic recognition of the rather ata-
vistic return of Plato in Schmitt’s assessment of human rights 
claims in politics also points one to a second reason for in-
voking this assessment here. It ultimately exposes Schmitt’s 
assessment as outdated and vacuous as far as contemporary 
politics are concerned. This is crucial for the argument that 
follows. To the extent that his views can indeed be dismissed 
as outdated and vacuous today, his concept of state sover-
eignty hardly offers the contemporary state any ombre spiri-
tuel that could render it invisible from the outside and afford 
it a sheltered internal space from within which it can safe-
guard the public interest of its citizens in sovereign fashion. 
Any sovereign that would today enter the stage of conflict 
under the banner of raisons d’état other than fundamental 
rights concerns is more likely bound to expose its internal 
space to, rather than sheltering it from, external questioning 
and, potentially, external threats. This is surely true in the 
case of conflicts between contemporary constitutional democ-
racies, but it is most likely true today also in conflicts be-
tween constitutional democracies and other contemporary 
forms of statehood. Under these conditions, it is the rhetori-
cal invocation of “relatively persuasive” fundamental rights 
norms that is bound to stretch the interpretive space – and 
prolong the diplomatic and juridical exchanges – that war-
rants invocation of the ombre spirituel and internal invisibility 
or opacity of statehood. Under contemporary conditions, the 
distinction between political normativity and realistic state-
craft no longer holds much water14. Reasons of state or state-
craft are today often more effectively sheltered under the um-
brella of human rights norms. Only those who no longer 
                                                   
14 See note 13. 
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wish to shelter, but indeed prefer to expose reasons of state – 
for purposes, perhaps, of raising the potential for conflict – 
will simply denounce the validity of human rights claims in 
whatever dispute is at stake. Whatever the strategies or goals 
behind such exposures of Realpolitik may be, the concern with 
sheltering an Arcanum effectively can surely no longer be 
counted among them.  
Schmitt’s assertion regarding the cheating at issue when 
human rights claims are raised in politics is surely not meant 
to apply only to human rights claims as such, but to all in-
stances of normative claims in politics. Any norm or Grund-
norm that invokes expansive or universal validity would con-
stitute cheating from this Schmittian perspective. The crucial 
move at issue in this “cheating” is to invoke a reason with 
regard to which obligatory endorsement by an enemy or 
adversary necessarily follows from the “self-evident” validity 
of that reason. Schmitt evidently did not pay attention to the 
fact that this expectation of recognition and endorsement also 
contaminates any upfront recourse to Realpolitik, as 
Thucydides’ portrayal of the demands of the Athenian en-
voys to the citizens of Melos makes clear15. Merely uttering a 
demand in the form of an explication communicates some 
expectation – however honest or dishonest – that some com-
prehension is due from the side of the other. But be it as it 
may, human rights have indeed displaced open recourse to 
Realpolitik in the second half of the twentieth century as far as 
the rhetorical sheltering of reasons of state is concerned, at 
least in the West. Had Schmitt been a little more percipient 
regarding the difference between rhetoric and cheating, he 
                                                   
15 See again note 11. 
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may well have been less inclined to simply dismiss all human 
rights claims in politics as instances of cheating.  
The distinction between cheating in the name of human 
rights, on the one hand, and honest rhetorical employment of 
human rights, on the other, is crucial for assessing what is 
really at stake in specific instances of human rights claims in 
politics. A fictional example of an obvious case of cheating – 
as distinct from the rhetorical employment of human rights – 
is useful for showing what is of concern here. Suppose a 
Christian theocratic state would justify coercive law or legis-
lation that publicly promotes the Christian religion at the ex-
pense of other religions with recourse to “the human right of 
every human being created by God to be guided towards the 
true religion.” That state would surely be uttering a seman-
tically coherent claim that meets basic requirements of com-
prehensibility. There is nevertheless no chance that anyone 
who is familiar with prevalent human rights discourses will 
consider this a serious let alone plausible human rights claim. 
Human rights discourses allow for a considerable range of 
plausible human rights claims that compete with one another 
– as we shall see below with regard to less fictional examples 
– but this one is evidently not among them. Should someone 
raise this claim, it would constitute an obvious case of cheat-
ing. The claim simply fails to shield or shelter a material in-
terest behind it and exposes it as something other than that 
which it pretends to be. And it is with this fictional example 
of an obviously cheating human rights claim in mind that we 
can now move on to assess the political contentiousness of 
human rights claims in contemporary Europe, the very conti-
nent on which, according to Scandamis (at least as far as the 
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European Union is concerned) the spiritual sheltering offered 
by statehood is no longer possible. 
According to Scandamis, the judiciaries of Member States 
have become the internal x-ray stations of the EU from the 
vantage points of which Member States can no longer hide 
anything from close or immediate observation16. Seen from 
this perspective, EU Member States surely seem deprived of 
their capacity to shade and shelter anything from the EU 
today. But attempts at such sheltering are still afoot in 
Europe, as a number of decisions of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court (GFCC) have made clear in recent years17. In 
view of these decisions, but also in view of jurisprudence that 
has come to the fore in the case law of the CJEU in recent 
years, it seems plausible to assert that human or fundamental 
rights claims have become key concerns in current defences 
of, or threats to, state sovereignty in the EU. Recourse to the 
constitutional duty of Member States to guarantee the human 
or fundamental rights of their citizens has indeed become the 
last resort for Member States’ endeavours to shelter concerns 
of “public order” and thus of essential “reasons of state”, 
from EU interference. And denial of such constitutional du-
ties has likewise – that is, also in the name of fundamental 
rights – become a crucial argument for justifying such EU 
interference. A certain human rights or fundamental rights 
argument, we shall see, is currently offered from both sides 
of this political divide and this indeed raises the question of 
                                                   
16 See the outline of the argument above. 
17 BVerfG 37, 271 (Solange I – 1974); BVerfG 73, 339 (Solange II – 
1986); BVerfG 89,155 (Maastricht – 1993) BVerfG 123, 267 (Lissabon – 
2009), 2 BvR 1390/12 (ESM – 2012). 
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whether someone is not cheating here. Too many aces seem 
to be going around this poker table.  
III. The Civil Societal Reduction  
of the ombre spirituel of Member States  
in the European Union 
Article 5 TFEU provides the basic criteria in terms of which 
the delimitation of Member State and EU competences must 
be assessed in cases of conflicting interpretations of this de-
limitation. At issue are the principles of conferral, subsidiar-
ity and proportionality respectively stipulated in Arti-
cles 5(1), 5(2), 5(3) and 5(4). In view of these provisions, the 
EU can only exercise power under title of the competences 
conferred to it by the Member States in the Treaties (Arti-
cle 5(1)). In areas of exclusive competence, EU power can 
only be exercised to attain EU objectives (Article 5(2)). In 
cases of shared competence, EU power can only be exercised 
if EU objectives cannot be achieved by the exercise of MS 
powers (Article 5(3)). All exercises of EU power are limited to 
what is necessary to attain the Treaty objectives (Article 5(4)). 
These provisions regarding the exercise of shared and exclu-
sive competences are further underpinned by broader princi-
ples of mutual respect and cooperation entrenched in Arti-
cle 4 TFEU. Article 4(2), in particular, stipulates that the EU 
will respect the “national identities … inherent in [the] fun-
damental [political and constitutional] structures of Member 
States.” 
That these principles of conferral, subsidiarity and propor-
tionality, along with the principles of the EU’s respect for na-
tional constitutional and political identities and mutual re-
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spect between the EU and Member States, could lead to con-
tentious questions regarding the actual exercise of power by 
the EU, is surprising in view of the further stipulation in Ar-
ticle 2 TFEU that the EU is “founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights…” Considering the cate-
gorical negligibility of any likelihood that any Member State 
may come to assert foundational or constitutional values that 
cannot be reconciled with the human rights values on which 
the EU is based according to Article 2, it must strike one as 
surprising that any significant or serious dispute regarding 
the limits of EU and Member State powers can arise at all. 
How can there be grounds for serious disagreement in the 
EU if everyone involved agrees on the basic principles of co-
operation, seems to be a pertinent question. Dieter Grimm 
surely provides one with the beginning of an answer to this 
question in the following passage: 
 
“[D]ivergences between EU and national fundamental rights 
norms increase by the day as integration marches ahead. The 
tendency of the CJEU is to review national law strictly, while 
treating EU law generously. Economic freedoms tend to enjoy 
more weight in the CJEU’s jurisprudence than personal and 
communication rights. The opposite is the case in the juris-
prudence of the GFCC. Whether this will change now that the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU has come into force, 
and with the impending accession of the EU to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, will have to be seen. In the 
meantime, however, this will remain a field in which the GFCC 
has to guard over national concerns”18. 
                                                   
18 Translated from DIETER GRIMM, Prinzipien statt Pragmatismus 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 February 2013. 
164  J. van der Walt 
 
To be sure, Grimm is not suggesting that the economic free-
doms are the only considerations that inform CJEU jurispru-
dence, but he is suggesting that these freedoms outweigh 
other considerations: “Economic freedoms tend to enjoy 
more weight in the CJEU’s jurisprudence than personal and 
communication rights.” And he is suggesting further that 
other considerations, namely personal and communication 
rights, are outweighing the economic freedoms in the juris-
prudence of the GFCC: “The opposite is the case in the juris-
prudence of the GFCC.” Grimm is evidently suggesting that 
the EU has not quite yet reached the stage where the eco-
nomic freedoms to which the CJEU gives precedence in its ju-
risprudence according to him, have completely dispelled the 
last vestiges of the ombre spirituel under which Member States 
may still shelter their citizens. But Grimm is not, on the other 
hand, very confident about the GFCC’s power to retain its ca-
pacity to shield its citizens under the ombre spirituel embodied 
in the personal and communication rights to which the GFCC 
gives precedence in its jurisprudence. The lines of his text 
that precede the lines quoted above make this very clear: 
 
“Lack of opportunities to turn its principles into concrete deci-
sions could result in the perpetuation of the ‘still acceptable’ 
findings that the [GFCC has articulated in the series of judg-
ments that started with the Solange cases]. All that would then 
be left for it to do would be smaller corrections regarding the 
application of the Treaties in the case of unambiguous compe-
tence violations or serious constitutional Fundamental Rights 
disagreements”19. 
                                                   
19 Ibid. 
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Considered in view of this realistic note regarding the re-
maining potential of the GFCC to shelter its citizens under its 
own ombre spirituel, Grimm’s assessment of the competing or 
conflicting lights that illuminate the European Union may 
not be offering much of a challenge to Scandamis’ assessment 
of the loss of this ombre spirituel of the Member States of the 
Union. But the significance of Grimm’s observation does not 
lie in the challenge or lack of challenge that it offers in re-
sponse to Scandamis. It lies in what it comes to tell us – per-
haps unwontedly – about the very discourse of light and 
shadows that Scandamis’ thesis regarding the Weberian-
Kelsenian launches. For Grimm is surely not understanding 
the protection that the GFCC may want to offer German citi-
zens as an opaque or shadowy national or nationalistic realm. 
He is surely understanding this protection as serving the 
Enlightenment ideals embodied in the personal and communi-
cation rights that enjoy priority in the jurisprudence of the 
GFCC, just like the CJEU does with regard to the guiding 
lights of freedom of movement and services by which it tends 
to rule at the expense of other rights or lights, according to 
Grimm. One can surely assume that the CJEU also regards 
the economic rights that it is said to prioritise in terms of 
enlightened and even Enlightenment concerns with personal 
liberty. The obscurity in which this whole discourse is envel-
oped should now be manifest. We are confronted by the EU 
as a legal-political stage, a stage on which light cast from one 
side of the stage aims to reduce to shadows the light cast 
from the other side, and vice versa. 
What emerges in the process is a confusing scene of shades 
– of “light” and “darkness” – that leaves no or very thin mar-
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gins for clear distinctions between them. One feels compelled 
once more to recall Nietzsche’s fool who came to illuminate 
the broad daylight with a lantern, so as to expose the sheer 
nothingness or indistinctness of it all20 . One can be sure, 
moreover, that on both sides of this spectrum of lights and 
shadows, the human rights values embodied in Article 2 
TFEU will remain the ultimate foundational values. Neither 
the CJEU nor the GFCC is going to argue at some point that 
the values they promote need not be thoroughly reconcilable 
with these human rights values. They are and will both be 
relying on the same trumps and the same Grundnorm as the 
game goes on, and the longer it goes on, the more will it be-
come manifest that there are more than four aces going 
around the table. The one who raises a human rights claim in 
a political conflict aims to cheat, asserts Schmitt. The claim 
seems highly pertinent under these circumstances. But here 
we seem to find ourselves in a doubly confusing situation 
where everyone seems to be cheating and no distinctions be-
tween cheating and not cheating seem possible anymore. 
How have we come to lose the distinction between truth-
fully sheltering shadows, on the one hand, and honest 
searching lights, on the other; and how might one attempt to 
restore this distinction? These are questions that one may 
well want to ask against this confusing background. I shall 
attempt to answer them with reference to three considera-
tions: 1) The civil societal reduction of liberty in the juris-
prudence of the CJEU; 2) The method of this civil societal re-
duction that the CJEU ironically inherited from one of its 
main adversaries today in the EU, namely, the GFCC; and  
3) The democratic restoration of the ombre spirituel of state-
                                                   
20 See again note 4 above. 
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hood. All three considerations will be further assessed in 
view of the distinction between rhetoric and cheating in-
voked with reference to Schmitt above.  
1) The Civil Societal Reduction of Liberty in the Jurisprud-
ence of the CJEU 
When the light bulb of pre-modern metaphysics finally 
blew – the energy saving device called “God” through which 
pre-modern emperors, monarchs and princes endeavoured to 
remain splendidly illuminated powers for as long and as se-
curely as possible – modern societies found themselves aban-
doned to their own power-generating and power-saving de-
vices. Fundamental rights were one of the key inventions 
through which they sought to generate and salvage power 
from immanent sources, now that transcendence had finally 
fizzled out and fused. The invention of fundamental rights 
allowed them to divide themselves into sources of legitima-
tion and objects of legitimation. The internal division of itself 
into a source of legitimation – civil society – and an object of 
legitimation – the state – was the way in which modern soci-
ety generated power or constituted itself as a source of 
power. A passage from Grundrechte als Institution, an early 
text of Luhmann, is most significant in this regard: 
 
“The necessity to provide foundations – of which the profound 
rootedness in the division between thought and existence can-
not be discussed here – splits social reality with cleaving force 
into a sphere of the state and a sphere of society. The state has 
to justify itself to and in society. (Hegel’s conception, which 
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takes over this principle of division but inverses the founda-
tional relation, never received a real following)”21. 
 
In the wake of this division, the fundamental rights of citi-
zens would effectively become the batteries from which the 
state would draw its power. The rest of the text from the 
early pages of which this passage is drawn seeks to dispel the 
idea that civil rights weakened or curbed the power of the 
state that is often entertained by more facile understanding of 
civil rights. Civil rights became the source of legitimate state 
action. They constituted the self-evident parameters between 
which states could act and act forcefully. Sovereigns could 
appeal to civil rights – and claim to be acting in honour and 
pursuit of them – in the same way that they used to be able to 
appeal to God. Chris Thornhill elaborates this pivotal move 
in Grundrechte als Institution further in a powerful socio-
historical narrative of the development of modern constitu-
tionalism22. The intriguing aspect of Luhmann’s articulation 
of the crucial dynamics of modern legitimation is, however, 
not restricted to the ingenious way in which he portrays civil 
rights as the sustainable source of modern power that lit-
                                                   
21 NIKLAS LUHMANN, Grundrechte als Institution (Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblott, 1965) 27: “[Es ist] die Notwendigkeit der Begründung, 
deren tiefe Wurzeln in der Scheidung von Sein und Denken hier nicht 
freigelegt werdern können, die mit bohrender Kraft die soziale Wirklichkeit 
aufspaltet in eine Sphäre des Staates und eine Sphäre der Gesellschaft. Der 
Staat hat sich in der Gesellschaft und and der Gesellschaft zu rechtferti-
gen. (Die Auffassung Hegels, die das Trennschema übernimmt, aber das 
Begründungsverhältnis umkehrt, blieb ohne reale Folgen.)” 
22 See CHRIS THORNHILL, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions 
and State Legitimacy in Historical-Sociological Perspective (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
The ombre spirituel of Statehood in the European Union 169 
 
erally liberates power from relying on non-sustainable or 
already-exhausted external or transcendent sources. The 
other intriguing aspect of the passage consists in the way 
Luhmann acknowledges that Hegel already articulated this 
scheme of division (Trennschema), but did so in an inverse 
fashion. Luhmann does not elaborate the point further, but it 
is important to understand well what he is alluding to. For 
Hegel, the dynamics of modern legitimation also consisted in 
the relation between state and civil society, but for him, the 
state was the source of legitimation and civil society the ob-
ject of legitimation. At issue here is the thesis that Joachim 
Ritter articulated brilliantly in his essay on Hegel and the 
French Revolution23. Hegel regarded the modern state as the 
embodiment and guardian of the Kantian ideal of moral 
autonomy that inspired the French Revolution. For Hegel the 
state remained responsible for preventing the reduction of 
Kantian moral autonomy to economic liberty in modern so-
cieties, and he masterfully portrayed the potential of civil so-
ciety to reduce moral autonomy to economic liberty and to 
ultimately destroy moral autonomy completely. For him it 
was the duty of the state, as guarantor of Kantian morality, to 
prevent this from happening24. 
Hegel was not followed, observes Luhmann in passing, and 
here too he is undoubtedly right. The development of 
nineteenth-century liberal constitutionalism in Germany (but 
also in the United States) would ultimately end with the 
triumph of economic liberties over a broader Kantian under-
                                                   
23  JOACHIM RITTER, Hegel und die französische Revolution, in: 
Metaphysik und Politik (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2003) 183-255.  
24 For a more extensive exposition of Hegel’s critique of civil so-
ciety, see VAN DER WALT, The Horizontal Effect Revolution 275-281. 
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standing of moral liberty25. From this triumph of economic 
liberty over Kantian moral autonomy at the end of the nine-
teenth century, it was but a short step to the twentieth-
century reduction of constitutional liberty to economic liberty 
in the conservative ordo-liberal economic thinking of a group 
of theorists that became known as the Freiburg School. The 
ordo-liberal turn in constitutional thinking indeed took eco-
nomic liberty as the deontological or moral base of modern 
societies and turned it into its sole constitutional principle 
(thus turning constitutional law into competition law). And it 
is this ordo-liberalism that became the main framework of 
thinking embodied in the European Treaties and ultimately 
informed the privileging of economic liberties in the juris-
prudence of the CJEU26. 
Does this reduction of Kantian moral autonomy to eco-
nomic liberty constitute an instance of the cheating that 
Schmitt imputes to all invocations of human rights, or was it 
just the outcome of the rhetorical triumph of economic lib-
erties in Western societies, a triumph with which a post-
metaphysical society must reconcile itself as one of the many 
possibilities of privileging of which rhetoric is capable in a 
godless age? This question cannot be answered with refer-
ence to the contents of contingent outcomes of normative 
privileging. The normative scheme of fundamental rights on 
which modern Western societies would come to turn indeed 
lends itself to the rhetorical privileging of either economic 
liberty or broader communicative liberty, to invoke again 
Grimm’s assessment of the respective tendencies in the juris-
                                                   
25 For a more extensive exposition of this history, see VAN DER 
WALT, The Horizontal Effect Revolution 37-84. 
26 See VAN DER WALT, The Horizontal Effect Revolution 246-251. 
The ombre spirituel of Statehood in the European Union 171 
 
prudence of the CJEU and GFCC. The question of cheating 
and the distinction between cheating and rhetoric cannot be 
answered with regard to the normative content that happens 
to triumph in some normative dispute. But it can be an-
swered with regard to the method with which victory is pro-
cured. It is therefore to the question of the method by which 
economic liberties triumph in the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
that we must turn next.  
2) The Method of the CJEU’s Civil Societal Reduction of 
Liberty – A GFCC Legacy 
Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde famously observed that liberal 
democratic societies turn on foundations that they cannot 
guarantee 27 . This observation, now widely known as the 
Böckenförde dictum, re-articulates the point that Claude 
Lefort also made in masterly fashion: 
 
                                                   
27 ERNST WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit 
(Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp, 1976), 60: “Der freiheitliche säkulari-
sierte Staat lebt von Voraussetzungen, die er selbst nicht garantie-
ren kann. Das ist das große Wagnis, das er, um der Freiheit willen, einge-
gangen ist. Als freiheitlicher Staat kann er einerseits nur bestehen, wenn 
sich die Freiheit, die er seinen Bürgern gewährt, von innen her, aus der 
moralischen Substanz des einzelnen und der Homogenität der Gesell-
schaft, reguliert. Anderseits kann er diese inneren Regulierungskräfte 
nicht von sich aus, das heißt mit den Mitteln des Rechtszwanges und au-
toritativen Gebots zu garantieren suchen, ohne seine Freiheitlichkeit auf-
zugeben und – auf säkularisierter Ebene – in jenen Totalitätsanspruch zu-
rückzufallen, aus dem er in den konfessionellen Bürgerkriege herausge-
führt hat.”  
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Democracy is of all regimes … the only one to have represented 
power in such a way as to show that power is an empty place 
and to thereby maintain a gap between the symbolic and the 
real … by virtue of a discourse which reveals that power be-
longs to no one28. 
 
The democratic representation of the empty place of power 
that Lefort invokes here does not concern an arbitrary choice, 
but a response to a theological or philosophical regard for the 
reality that the exercise of all power commences in a space 
that precedes it. Lefort again: 
 
“Every religion states in its own way that human society can 
only open onto itself by being held in an opening it did not 
create. Philosophy says the same thing, but religion said it first, 
albeit in terms that philosophy cannot accept.” 
 
“What philosophical thought strives to preserve is the experi-
ence of a difference that goes beyond difference of opinion (and 
                                                   
28  CLAUDE LEFORT, Permanence of the Theological-Political in: 
HENT DE VRIES / LAWRENCE SULLIVAN (eds) Political Theologies (New 
York: Fordham University Press), 159. The French – CLAUDE 
LEFORT, Permanence du théologico-politique? in: Essais sur le poli-
tique XIX-XX siècles (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1986), 291 – reads: 
“[D]e tous les régimes que nous nous connaissons, [la démocratie] est le 
seul dans lequel soit aménagée une représentation du pouvoir qui atteste 
qu’il est un lieu vide.” Cf. also CLAUDE LEFORT, L’invention Démocra-
tique: Les Limites de la Domination Totalitaire (Paris: Fayard, Artheme, 
Librairie, 1994), 92: “[L]’image de la souveraineté populaire se joint celle 
d’un lieu vide, impossible à occuper.” 
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the recognition of the relativity of points of view that this im-
plies)”29. 
 
Democracy can accordingly, with reference to both 
Böckenförde and Lefort, but also with reference to 
Luhmann’s passage quoted above, be understood as an auto-
generative or autopoietic exercise of power that operates in 
an opening that offers it nothing more than a temporal op-
portunity or chance. This temporal opportunity allows for 
autopoietic operations of power, but never for the substan-
tive inclusion of the opening or opportunity itself within the 
operation of power at issue. Any substantive reference to the 
opening in which it operates would constitute the end of 
autopoiesis and the beginning of heteropoiesis. All instances 
of autopoiesis are subject to this intrinsic restriction, but de-
mocracy is unique for reasons of devising a method of 
decision-making that consistently commits itself to the open-
ing in which it operates without including it as a substantive 
norm or basis for decision-making. That unique method is 
the majority decision-making method. 
Those who take part in majority decision-making do not 
and cannot claim an external source of validation for the de-
                                                   
29  LEFORT, Permanence of the Theological-Political 157. The 
French text – cf.  Permanence du théologico-politique?  287 – reads: 
“Que la société humaine n’ait une ouverture sur elle-même que 
prise dans une ouverture qu’elle ne fait pas, cela, justement, toute 
religion le dit, chacune à sa manière, de même que la philosophie, et 
avant elle, quoique dans un langage que celle-ci ne peut faire sien ... 
Or, ce que la pensée philosophique veut préserver, c’est l’expé-
rience d’une différence qui, par-delà celle des opinions ... n’est pas 
à la disposition des hommes.”  
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cisions that will be made in the process. It is neither neces-
sary nor meaningful to vote on propositions with intrinsic 
validation, that is, propositions that are validated in advance. 
Recourse to voting and majority outcomes is the way in 
which democracy acknowledges that the decision-making 
that it launches cannot be validated. It is because we cannot 
determine the truth or the validity of a claim that democracy 
resorts to voting on the matter30. Those who naively believe 
majorities attain to truth and get decisions right – the belief 
that Schmitt still imputed to nineteenth-century parliaments31 
– have a spurious and shallow understanding of democracy 
that does not grasp its unique concern with the undecidable 
and with that which will and can never be fully validated or 
legitimated. But every useful committee member knows that 
we simply turn to voting on matters with regard to which we 
know we will never have good grounds or sufficient reason 
for consensus. Rhetoric plays a crucial role in swaying the 
vote, but it never pretends to furnish grounds that terminate 
the need for a decision that remains groundless. It does not 
render the decision that decides the undecidable obsolete, but 
in fact sustains it. Truthful rhetoric – rhetoric that does not re-
sort or amount to cheating – remains constantly aware of and 
consistently acknowledges its truthless condition. 
All of this may sound like an anti-normative Schmittian de-
cisionism, but this truthless condition can also be traced to 
the heart of Kantian morality. The moral imperative that 
                                                   
30 See JEREMY WALDRON, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) for a meticulous articulation of this argu-
ment. 
31 SCHMITT, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentaris-
mus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996). 
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Kant devised turns on a universalizability that remains im-
possible under finite conditions. Kant understood this well. 
That is why he postulated the eternal life of the soul for pur-
poses of rendering moral perfection thinkable. Under condi-
tions of finite life, however, moral decisions remain particu-
lar decisions that allude to a universality to which it cannot 
give effect. In this regard, Kant was evidently a forerunner of 
Lefort and Böckenförde. What ultimately separates Kant 
from Schmitt is the latter’s insistence that any allusion to uni-
versality (or normativity) is cheating. Kantian normativity, 
however, turns on the insight that an impossible universality 
is the very opening that affords all particular normative 
claims their groundless opportunity.  
Classical modes of constitutional review employed a three-
pronged proportionality test that endorsed and promoted the 
understanding of democracy that Böckenförde and Lefort ar-
ticulate. Classical proportionality review procedures by and 
large endorsed the right or freedom of majorities to decide 
the undecidable. For the most part (there is an exception with 
which we cannot deal here32), all it did was to ensure that 
majority decisions in the face of the undecidable remain true 
to their irreducible undecidability by not imposing them-
selves in unnecessary ways on minorities who would have 
decided them differently had they been able to do so. This 
“lack of necessity test” was embodied in the second and third 
                                                   
32 There are exceptional cases in which a judiciary can dismiss 
legislation as patently inappropriate (falling foul of the first leg of 
the proportionality test), but such cases should be extremely rare in 
any well-functioning democracy. For a more extensive exposition 
of this point, see VAN DER WALT, The Horizontal Effect Revolution 
374-379.  
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legs of the classical proportionality test, namely, in the re-
quirements that majority decisions remain rational (the 
means must serve the end) and as little intrusive as possible 
(the same end must not be reachable by less intrusive means). 
For the rest, the classical proportionality test, through its first 
leg – the simple requirement that the ends pursued by legis-
lation must just be “appropriate”, that is, reconcilable with 
that which we normally understand under “an open democ-
ratic society” – was quite content to let democracy have its 
free day in parliament. 
Let us now consider the civil societal reduction of funda-
mental rights to economic liberties discussed above from the 
perspective of this understanding of the classical proportion-
ality test in judicial review. The series of CJEU judgments 
that came to be known as the Laval and Viking quartet – Laval, 
Viking, Rüffert and Luxembourg – can be singled out as the 
apex of this civil societal reduction of the broad scope of fun-
damental rights to a narrow set of economic freedoms in the 
EU today33. To be sure, these cases were decided before Ar-
ticle 4(2) TFEU came into force. The principle of respecting 
“national identities … inherent in [the] fundamental [political 
and constitutional] structures of Member States,” was thus 
not yet a positive Treaty provision at the time and could at 
best have been a jurisprudential principle. But, this jurispru-
dential principle can surely be said to have been implied by 
the positive subsidiarity and proportionality provisions that 
had already been in place in Article 5 TEC at the time these 
cases were decided (2007/2008). Moreover, even before the 
                                                   
33  EU: Case C-341/05 [2007] (Laval); EU: Case C-438/05 [2007] 
(Viking); EU: Case C-346/06 [2008] (Rüffert); EU: Case C-319/06 
[2008] (Luxembourg).  
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TFEU came into force, the CJEU had already passed judg-
ments under the TEC in which economic freedoms were duly 
subordinated to personal and communication rights. Notable 
among them were the judgments in Schmidberger (2003) and 
Omega (2004) 34 . One therefore has no or little ground to 
simply impute unabashed CJEU bias in favour of economic 
freedoms and against other fundamental rights that may con-
stitute crucial concerns of “national identities … inherent in 
[the] fundamental [political and constitutional] structures of 
Member States.” 
The questions at stake here, however, are far from an-
swered by invoking cases in which the Court subordinated 
economic freedoms to other fundamental rights and by sug-
gesting the Court is evidently searching for the right balance 
between fundamental rights and economic freedoms35. No 
one who wishes to cheat will cheat conspicuously. But, the 
absence of conspicuous cheating is for the same reason no 
ground for believing no cheating is afoot. There is wide scope 
for insisting plausibly that the Court has feigned just enough 
balancing in the overall course plotted in its decisions to ob-
fuscate a subtle but crucial reduction of the broad scope of 
fundamental rights to economic freedoms in the long run. 
Playing the hands that the Court played in Schmidberger and 
Omega was just good poker that set up the big hauls in the 
Laval and Viking series of cases, would be the skeptical sug-
                                                   
34  Omega Case C-36/02 (CJEU) [2004]; Schmidberger v. Austria  
C-112/00 (CJEU) [2003]. 
35 See CHARLES F. SABEL / OLIVER H. GERSTENBERG, Constitution-
alising an Overlapping Consensus: The CJEU and the Emergence of 
a Coordinate Constitutional Order. European Law Journal 16, no. 5 
(2010): 511-550. 
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gestion that one could plausibly put forward here. It is also 
against this background that one must understand Catherine 
Barnard’s observation that the balancing procedures in Laval 
and Viking afforded only rhetorical value to the right to 
strike36. This is another way of saying that the Court only 
paid “lip service” to the right to strike, and “lip service” goes 
down as a subtle form of cheating in most people’s dictionar-
ies. My aim here is nevertheless not to repeat direct accusa-
tions of cheating that will surely be met with endless refuta-
tions and will ultimately surely merit being dismissed as 
“groundless” (just as the insistence that no cheating but 
proper balancing prevails here ultimately merits being dis-
missed as groundless). If there is deliberate cheating going on 
here, the one who is cheating is most likely going to get away 
with it. My point is much rather to explain a situation that 
exposes the court to an accusation of an institutional cheating 
that is, I believe, irrefutable. At issue is the jurisprudential 
position into which the CJEU has manoeuvred itself, a posi-
tion from where it can act like a sovereign government while 
pretending to be bound to explaining and applying existing 
law. And it is this institutional cheating that the understanding 
of the classical proportionality outlined above allows us to 
see clearly. 
                                                   
36  CATHERINE BARNARD, Employment Rights, Free Movement 
under the EC Treaty and the Services Directive, in: EU Industrial Re-
lations v. National Industrial Relations (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer 
Law International, 2008), 137-168, especially at 151: “It could be ar-
gued that this is, in fact, balance in name, not substance…. Commu-
nity law automatically puts the ‘social’ on the back-foot…. Despite 
the recognition of the right to strike as a fundamental right … this 
recognition has little more than rhetorical value.” 
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Had the classical proportionality test been employed in the 
Laval and Viking series of cases, the CJEU would have had to 
defer to law and legislation in Member States, considering 
the absence of relevant legislation at EU level that changed 
Member State law37. And the relative Member State law and 
legislation that applied in these cases would surely have had 
to be recognised as perfectly reconcilable with the constitu-
tional democracy for which both the EU and its Member 
States stand38. The court did not use the classical proportion-
ality test, but it might be argued at first glance that these 
cases ultimately turned on the third leg of the classical 
proportionality test. The court indeed argued that the strikes 
in Laval and Viking – and by consequence the law that al-
lowed for these strikes – were disproportionate for practically 
putting a factory owner and ferry owner completely out of 
business everywhere in the European Union, thus rendering 
their economic freedom meaningless. The facilitative law and 
legislation at stake here go too far, goes this argument. They 
did not constitute or ensure the least intrusive way of resolv-
ing the conflicts at stake in the disputes. The lack of sub-
stance of this argument becomes evident, however, when one 
                                                   
37 As I argue elsewhere, the invocation of the completely irrele-
vant Directive 96/71 in Laval, Viking and Rüffert, either transgressed 
the boundaries of the concept of disingenuousness, or shifted them 
significantly.  
38 For fuller articulations of this point, see VAN DER WALT, The 
Horizontal Effect Revolution 334-352; VAN DER WALT, Timeo Danais 
Dona Ferre and the Constitution that Europeans may one day have 
given themselves in: JOHAN VAN DER WALT / JEFFREY ELLSWORTH 
(eds) Constitutional Sovereignty and Social Solidarity in Europe (Baden 
Baden: Nomos, 2015) 304 fn. 76. 
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considers how often democratic governments pass legislation 
and budgets that put thousands of citizens out of employ-
ment. Now, one may think politically that such employment-
destroying legislation or law is disproportionate. One can for 
this reason engage in political action in pursuit of legislative 
change. But, one cannot in this case claim disproportionality 
as a matter of legal principle, without depriving a majority 
government of a decision that no one can decide with suffi-
cient grounds. All the arguments for and against that might 
possibly be raised in a court of law and many more will be 
raised with much more expertise and much more time and 
space for debate in parliaments, and in the end the ultimate 
groundlessness of all arguments will have to give way to a 
simple majority vote on a bill that will forever remain contin-
gent upon the sustenance of that majority. By deciding just 
the opposite, that is, that law and legislation cannot put an 
employer out of business (by allowing for strikes that have 
this effect), the CJEU effectively did the very same thing. It 
deprived the legislators involved of the power to take the 
surely groundless but democratically perfectly acceptable po-
litical decision that such regulation of business and entrepre-
neurship is quite in order. And it thus transformed the politi-
cal opposition to such strikes into a legal principle which a 
court must uphold. 
How did we arrive at the kind of decision-making that pre-
vailed, not only in the Laval and Viking decisions, but also in 
Omega and Schmidberger? In the course of the twentieth cen-
tury, the GFCC began to generate its own “legislation” by 
moving to decide undecidable matters in court. It did so by 
introducing a new proportionality test. It developed this new 
test in the horizontal effect jurisprudence that it articulated 
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most famously in its celebrated Lüth decision of 1957. This 
new test turned on an abstract judicial balancing of competing 
constitutional values. From the results of this balancing test, 
the GFCC came to believe, since Lüth, that a judiciary could 
generate new legal norms on the basis of which unprecedented 
cases could be decided with sufficient precision and legiti-
macy. Böckenförde observed clearly how this jurisgenerative 
conception of judicial balancing widens judicial powers and 
narrows the scope of democratic politics in legal cultures 
where it takes hold39. The difference between this jurisgenera-
tive balancing and the balancing that takes place under the 
third leg of the classical proportionality test is significant. The 
latter has to turn on hard and specific evidence that a parlia-
mentary decision already taken can be less intrusive. The one 
who brings the constitutional objection must offer this evi-
dence clearly and precisely enough to restrict the judicial de-
cision to a relatively simple fact finding. And no new juridi-
cal norm is created in the process. All that happens is that a 
very specific interpretation of a norm is disallowed and sent 
back to parliament for amendment. The former – jurisgenera-
tive judicial balancing – invariably turns on considerations 
that emanate from a broad judicial hermeneutics, the hard 
evidence of which is not only invariably lacking, but in prin-
ciple also impossible, considering the institutional restrictions 
that define the judicial forum and judicial reasoning. What 
happens in this balancing remains obscure. It remains envel-
oped in darkness, as Matthias Rüffert puts it well with refer-
ence to the jurisprudence that the GFCC launched in Lüth – 
                                                   
39  BÖCKENFÖRDE, Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen, Der Staat 
(1990): 25: “Es volzieht sich ein gleitender Übergang vom parlamentari-
schen Gesetzgebungsstaat zum verfassungsrechtlichen Jurisdiktionstaat.” 
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[w]ie es zur Rückumwandlung der objektivrechtlichen Ausstrah-
lungswirkung in ein subjektives, verfassungsbeschwerdefähiges 
Grundrecht kommt … bleibt im Dunkeln40. 
It is under the dark cloud of this new kind of judicial bal-
ancing that real scope opens up for a distinction between 
cheating and rhetoric. Judges may and do resort to all kinds 
of rhetorical devices in their decisions, but they cannot own 
up to the sheer rhetorical status of their normative delibera-
tions. They cannot offer their decisions as groundless at-
tempts to decide the undecidable in a way that leaves the 
fundamental temporal opportunity for decision-making de-
cidedly open, as democratic majorities do by definition when 
legislation is passed in parliament. The whole institutional 
setting in which judges are required to perform their task 
calls for accurate deference to existing law, that is, deference 
to an evident closure – a numerus clausus of norms – that is 
already in place before they enter the scene. The more they 
engage in unconstrained deliberation of undecidable ques-
tions under the guise of merely identifying existing law, the 
more will and can they be perceived to be cheating, irrespec-
tive of the fact that they may never do so deliberately or in-
tentionally. 
The balancing procedures that the CJEU basically inherited 
from the jurisprudence that the GFCC launched in Lüth com-
mit them to an institutional lie. The civil societal reduction of 
the undecidability of Kantian moral autonomy to economic 
liberty cannot constitute cheating in the rhetorical practices of 
parliament, for parliamentary practices and procedures attest 
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to their own groundlessness. But the civil societal reduction 
of the undecidability of Kantian morality to economic liberty 
does constitute a manner of cheating when it happens in a 
court of law, for judicial practices and procedures do pretend 
to resolve questions in a principled and well-founded way 
that merits full consensus and endorsement. 
3) The Democratic Restoration of the ombre spirituel of 
Statehood 
Scandamis’ essay L’Etat dans l’Union européenne: Passion 
d'un grand acteur suggests the EU has flayed the Westphalian 
Leviathan. It has laid its dark insides bare to relentless scru-
tiny. Perhaps. But perhaps it could only do so by appropriat-
ing these dark insides for itself. The ombre spirituel that 
Schmitt associated with sovereign statehood does not seem to 
have disappeared like the rest of nationalistic mists before the 
rising sun of European integration. It has simply shifted 
along with the pretensions of this rising sun. The market 
place has in broad daylight become the source of a new 
shadow. The CJEU, the principal agent of EU integration 
since its decisions in the Costa v ENEL and Van Gend & Loos 
cases41, has simply taken over the many ombres spirituels of 
the Member States in the form of one cloudy jurisprudence 
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that allows for no or little democratic scrutiny. Ironically, this 
ombre spirituel was first wrested from Member State parlia-
mentary majorities by Member State judiciaries. And then it 
was wrested from these judiciaries by another judiciary with 
recourse to the same ploy. The European Union does not 
claim to be a sovereign state as yet and it is often said that its 
goal is also not to become one. In the meantime, however, it 
pursues its goals in the manner of a state under the ombre 
spirituel offered by an obscure jurisprudence. It also does this 
in collaboration with a dubious theological mind-set that ren-
ders its modern status suspect42. 
This is the bottom line of the gigantic institutional cheating 
that is currently afoot in the EU: sovereign government by a 
sovereign that is not claiming to be sovereign nor recognised 
as one. The way out of this institutional lie is probably not 
backward into the past, but forward into an unknown future. 
And if the way forward is also to promise a way out of the 
obscurantism of the present, it will have to consist in more 
than recognition and acknowledgment of EU sovereignty. It 
will have to comprise the inauguration of adequate parlia-
mentary sovereignty in the EU. The same would apply if the 
road ahead should turn out to be backward, that is, towards 
proper restoration of Member State sovereignty. Here too 
will Member State judiciaries have to give back the ombre spi-
rituel that attaches to sovereign statehood to their parlia-
ments. For it is only in the context of open parliamentary de-
bates that the ultimately groundless decisions through which 
we eventually terminate irreducible dissent – and through 
which all normativity retains its irreducible link with the 
                                                   
42 See PHILLIP MANOW, Ordoliberalismus als ökonomische Ord-
nungstheologie. Leviathan 29, no. 2 (2001): 179-198. 
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groundless exercise of power or Herrschaft – can be advocated 
vociferously and with rhetorical acumen without constant ex-
posure to cogent accusations or suspicions of cheating. This is 
so because truthful democratic argument does not aim or 
claim to dispel the irreducible openness or groundlessness – 
the truthlessness – that affords it its very opportunity. It guards 
its own secret through the very way in which it honestly 
seeks to respond to it. 
 
